Journal of Science Policy & Governance
Volume 28, Issue 01 | July 6, 2026

Policy Memo
Post-Quantum Cryptography: The Quantum Arms Race and its Threat to Strategic Stability

Christian F. Custodio (1)
  1. United States Military Academy, Department of Physics and Nuclear Engineering, West Point, NY, 10996, USA,  
​Corresponding author: [email protected]​
Keywords: post-quantum cryptography;  quantum computing; harvest now, decrypt later; strategic stability;  cybersecurity policy; national security; RSA encryption
https://doi.org/10.38126/JSPG280102 ​

Executive Summary

The landscape of quantum technology is evolving with computing at the forefront of nations’ policies and budgets. Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) promises a new era of secure information with the threat that quantum-capable computers pose to classical encryption methods. In response, the federal government has issued national security memoranda which aim to secure government and corporate systems. However, current policy does not address the issue of "harvest now, decrypt later" attacks, where adversaries collect classically encrypted information today to decrypt once a quantum-capable computer is developed. This inevitable mass decryption event would expose large amounts of classified information and could potentially undermine strategic stability. Countries like Russia and China have already invested heavily to develop quantum computers and outpace our capabilities. To counter this risk, federal agencies—including NIST, NSA, DHS, and the State Department—must accelerate the quantum-resistance timeline, expand access to new encryption standards, and create organizations that support diplomatic engagement. These efforts will reduce our vulnerability and strengthen bilateral relations in this new era of information security.

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Christian Custodio earned his Bachelor of Science from the United States Military Academy, where he majored in Physics and minored in Russian. While at West Point, his research focused on the development of a quantum antenna at the Quantum Information Science Laboratory and the creation of experimental optics guides. He currently serves as a Second Lieutenant in the U.S. Army as an Aviation officer.

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