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Journal of Science Policy & Governance | Volume 16, Issue 01 | April 13, 2020
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White Paper: The Possible Expiration of the New START, the Last Nuclear Bilateral Treaty Between the United States and the Russian Federation
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Daniel Puentes, Matthew J. Kuhn, Chelsie Boodoo, Kylie R. Smith, Nicholas T. Young
MSU SciComm, Michigan State University, East Lansing, MI |
Keywords: Nuclear Arms Control; New START Extension; Russia; United States
Executive Summary: As the world returns to an era of great-power conflict, past treaties and agreements have unraveled. The New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) is the last bilateral arms control treaty that still exists between the United States (US) and the Russian Federation after the US exited the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty on August 2, 2019. New START places caps on the number of deployed nuclear warheads and the number of deployed and non-deployed delivery systems for these warheads for both states. New START is set to expire on February 5, 2021 unless both executive leaders agree to a five-year extension. The fate of New START results in three options: extension for five years, immediate replacement with another treaty or agreement, or expiration.
I. Introduction
Since 2018, the United States (US) has faced rising tensions over the regulation of nuclear armaments between sovereign states across the globe, straining long-standing arms agreements. These long-standing agreements, focused on limiting the weapons arsenals of world superpowers, have prevented arms races such as those seen during the Cold War. The most scrutinized relationship among nuclear superpowers is that of the US and Russian Federation. A failure to comply with international legal stipulations by nations such as the Russian Federation and the Islamic Republic of Iran has led to the early termination of two of the three major nuclear arms treaties and agreements involving the US and the Russian Federation in the 21st century. Without an extension of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), the third and final of the major nuclear arms treaties, will expire in 2021, potentially leaving the US and the Russian Federation without an arms agreement for the first time since 1972.
In order to establish an effective arms treaty between the US and the Russian Federation and prevent unimpeded nuclear proliferation, a firm understanding of previous arms control treaties before the START era is necessary.
In order to establish an effective arms treaty between the US and the Russian Federation and prevent unimpeded nuclear proliferation, a firm understanding of previous arms control treaties before the START era is necessary.
i. Previous arms control treaties
The United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) entered into the Cold War following the conclusion of World War II in 1945. From then until the late 1960s, the two nuclear superpowers continued to grow their nuclear arsenal in both power and numbers. Following the entrance of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the US and USSR began negotiations for nuclear arms control (Nuclear Threat Initiative 2019). This first set of conferences was known as the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) I, which eventually resulted in the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and an interim agreement known as the SALT I Treaty in 1972 (Office of the Historian n.d.). These treaties were signed by US President Richard Nixon and Soviet General Secretary President Leonid Brezhnev. Shortly after signing, negotiations began for SALT II throughout the 1970s. However, due to Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, the SALT II deliberations were dropped (Kimball 2019a). This was not the end for arms control between the two nuclear superpowers, however.
The Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty marked a turning point in the Cold War as a bilateral agreement aimed at limiting the proliferation of nuclear weapons between the world’s leading superpowers at the time. Signed in 1987 and implemented in 1991, the first-of-its-kind INF treaty required the destruction of ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges of 500-5,500 km and banned future production and testing of such weapons. A crucial aspect of the INF treaty was the implementation of compliance inspections, which verified that both countries had eliminated the weapons of interest to become compliant at the implementation date (Kimball 2019b). Unfortunately, in the early 2000s, the global climate began to disrupt the nuclear security environment. Following the 9/11 attacks, the Bush Administration began the procedure to exit from the ABM treaty with the Russian Federation (Neilan 2001). This raised doubts about the future viability of the INF treaty, with more serious concerns beginning in 2014 foreshadowing an eventual unilateral termination by the US in 2019.
The US State Department began filing violation reports in 2014 regarding the testing and deployment of Russian cruise missiles with ranges falling within those set by the INF treaty ban. Although Moscow has refuted each claim, if Russia has indeed stayed within the precise confines of the treaty, their weapons testing pushes the treaty boundaries and edges ever further into a grey zone of violation. Speaking on such INF treaty violations, then US Director of National Intelligence, Daniel Coats, stated, “Russia conducted the flight test program in a way that appeared purposefully designed to disguise the true nature of their testing” (Henderson 2018, 14). Counter to this, the Russian Federation has made retaliatory accusations, claiming that the implementation of US missile defense systems in Europe violates treaty language (Ryabkov 2017).
Lastly, both countries have raised concerns over the specter of China’s nuclear growth. Without an agreement that involved the People’s Republic of China, both the US and Russian Federation were placed at a disadvantage. For these reasons, President Donald Trump declared in February 2019 that the US would be suspending its obligations to the INF treaty and ultimately pulled out of the agreement six months later, on August 2, 2019 (Kimball 2019b).
The Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty marked a turning point in the Cold War as a bilateral agreement aimed at limiting the proliferation of nuclear weapons between the world’s leading superpowers at the time. Signed in 1987 and implemented in 1991, the first-of-its-kind INF treaty required the destruction of ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges of 500-5,500 km and banned future production and testing of such weapons. A crucial aspect of the INF treaty was the implementation of compliance inspections, which verified that both countries had eliminated the weapons of interest to become compliant at the implementation date (Kimball 2019b). Unfortunately, in the early 2000s, the global climate began to disrupt the nuclear security environment. Following the 9/11 attacks, the Bush Administration began the procedure to exit from the ABM treaty with the Russian Federation (Neilan 2001). This raised doubts about the future viability of the INF treaty, with more serious concerns beginning in 2014 foreshadowing an eventual unilateral termination by the US in 2019.
The US State Department began filing violation reports in 2014 regarding the testing and deployment of Russian cruise missiles with ranges falling within those set by the INF treaty ban. Although Moscow has refuted each claim, if Russia has indeed stayed within the precise confines of the treaty, their weapons testing pushes the treaty boundaries and edges ever further into a grey zone of violation. Speaking on such INF treaty violations, then US Director of National Intelligence, Daniel Coats, stated, “Russia conducted the flight test program in a way that appeared purposefully designed to disguise the true nature of their testing” (Henderson 2018, 14). Counter to this, the Russian Federation has made retaliatory accusations, claiming that the implementation of US missile defense systems in Europe violates treaty language (Ryabkov 2017).
Lastly, both countries have raised concerns over the specter of China’s nuclear growth. Without an agreement that involved the People’s Republic of China, both the US and Russian Federation were placed at a disadvantage. For these reasons, President Donald Trump declared in February 2019 that the US would be suspending its obligations to the INF treaty and ultimately pulled out of the agreement six months later, on August 2, 2019 (Kimball 2019b).
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Daniel Puentes is a Ph.D. candidate at Michigan State University in the College of Natural Science. He is an Executive Board member and founder of MSU SciComm and a member of the National Science Policy Network (NSPN). Daniel has interests in both nuclear weapons and nuclear energy policy, both domestic and foreign.
Matthew J. Kuhn is a veterinarian and Ph.D. candidate at the Michigan State University College of Veterinary Medicine. Matt is also an active member of the Michigan Veterinary Medical Association’s Legislative Advisory Committee and specializes in agricultural policy.
Chelsie Boodoo is a Ph.D. student in the College of Engineering at Michigan State University. She is also Executive Board member and founder of MSU SciComm. Chelsie is a member of the National Science Policy Network (NSPN), and active with the Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS).
Kylie Smith is a Ph.D. student at Michigan State University in the College of Engineering. She is a member of MSU SciComm.
Nick Young is a Ph.D. candidate at Michigan State University in the Colleges of Natural Science and Engineering. He is also an Executive Board member of MSU SciComm.
Matthew J. Kuhn is a veterinarian and Ph.D. candidate at the Michigan State University College of Veterinary Medicine. Matt is also an active member of the Michigan Veterinary Medical Association’s Legislative Advisory Committee and specializes in agricultural policy.
Chelsie Boodoo is a Ph.D. student in the College of Engineering at Michigan State University. She is also Executive Board member and founder of MSU SciComm. Chelsie is a member of the National Science Policy Network (NSPN), and active with the Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS).
Kylie Smith is a Ph.D. student at Michigan State University in the College of Engineering. She is a member of MSU SciComm.
Nick Young is a Ph.D. candidate at Michigan State University in the Colleges of Natural Science and Engineering. He is also an Executive Board member of MSU SciComm.
Acknowledgments
We would like to thank MSU SciComm for hosting the Meta-Review on nuclear arms control treaties that provided the background for writing this manuscript. We would also like to thank the National Science Policy Network (NSPN) for facilitating the 2020 Election Initiative, for which this white paper is a product of. We thank our referees for the thoughtful comments and suggestions to improve the quality and flow of this manuscript.
Author Disclaimer
The opinions and statements expressed belong to the authors, and do not represent the views of the institutions with which they are affiliated.
We would like to thank MSU SciComm for hosting the Meta-Review on nuclear arms control treaties that provided the background for writing this manuscript. We would also like to thank the National Science Policy Network (NSPN) for facilitating the 2020 Election Initiative, for which this white paper is a product of. We thank our referees for the thoughtful comments and suggestions to improve the quality and flow of this manuscript.
Author Disclaimer
The opinions and statements expressed belong to the authors, and do not represent the views of the institutions with which they are affiliated.
DISCLAIMER: The findings and conclusions published herein are solely attributed to the author and not necessarily endorsed or adopted by the Journal of Science Policy and Governance. Articles are distributed in compliance with copyright and trademark agreements.
ISSN 2372-2193
ISSN 2372-2193
