Journal of Science Policy & Governance
  • Home
  • About
    • About
    • JSPG Anniversary Page
    • Staff
    • Ambassadors
    • Boards >
      • Advisory Board
      • Governing Board
      • Editorial Board
    • Careers >
      • Associate Editor
      • Ambassador
    • Partners
    • Sponsorships
    • Contact
  • Volumes
    • GHFUTURES2030 Strengthening Youth-centered Policy and Governance of Digital Transformations in Health.
    • UNESCO AND MGCY OPEN SCIENCE POLICIES AS AN ACCELERATOR FOR ACHIEVING THE SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT GOALS
    • Volume 21 Issue 01 >
      • Cover Memo: Volume 21, Issue 1, Summer Standard Issue
    • JSPG and UCL STEAPP Special Topics: Innovations in Science Diplomacy >
      • Cover Memo: Volume 20, Issue 3, Special Issue on Innovations in Science Diplomacy
    • Sigma XI-JSPG Special Issue: Re-envisioning STEM Education and Workforce Development for the 21st Century
    • Volume 20 Issue 01
    • JSPG Volume 19 Issue 01 (10 Years of Publishing)
    • Special Issue: 2021 NSPN-JSPG Policy Memo Competition
    • Special Issue: Shaping the Future of Science Policy
    • JSPG-UK SIN Special Issue: Climate Change Solutions
    • Volume 18 Issue 01
    • Special Issue: 2020 NSPN-JSPG Policy Memo Competition
    • Volume 17 Issue 01 (Supported by AAAS STPF)
    • JSPG-UN MGCY Special Issue: Impacts of Emerging Technologies
    • Volume 16 Issue 01
    • Volume 15 (Supported by CSPC)
    • Special Issue: 2019 NSPN-JSPG Policy Memo Competition
    • Volume 14
    • Volume 13
    • Volume 12
    • Volume 11
    • Volume 10
    • Volume 9
    • Volume 8
    • Volume 7
    • Volume 6
    • JSPG-UCS Special Issue: Healthy Food Policy
    • Volume 5
    • Volume 4
    • Special Issue: Hot Topics 2013
    • Volume 3
    • Volume 2
    • Volume 1
  • Submit to JSPG
    • Special Topics Call for Submissions: Policy and Governance on Science, Technology and Global Security
    • Special Topics Call for Submissions: Development Policy and Global Change Science to Achieve the Vision of Sustainable Americas
    • Submission deadlines and guidelines
  • Announcements
    • News
    • Blog
  • Events
    • JSPG, APS FPS Events
    • JSPG, IAI Events
    • Leadership chat series
  • Training
    • Writing
    • Resources
  • Media Mentions
  • Policy in action
  • Podcast

Nuclear-Powered Cruise Missiles: Burevestnik and its Implications

Image by Обработанный кадр из фильма - Гостелерадиофонд, Copyrighted free use, Link
Journal of Science Policy & Governance | Volume 16, Issue 01 | April 13, 2020

Technology Assessment: Nuclear-Powered Cruise Missiles: Burevestnik and its Implications

Leah Walker
Michigan State University, East Lansing, MI
Download PDF
Keywords: Nuclear; Missile; Ramjet; Russia

Executive Summary: In recent years the world has seen the greatest modernization of nuclear weapon arsenals since the end of the Cold War. This emergence of new weapon systems and new technologies comes at the same time that longstanding arms control agreements are faltering. Much of the innovation has been coming in the form of new weapon delivery systems, promising improved range, payload, speed, and stealth capabilities. With the US, China and other countries developing hypersonic missiles and Russia pursuing nuclear powered delivery systems, the world is entering a new era of nuclear weapons. ICBMs (Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles) changed the dynamics of the Cold War with their promise of global reach in under an hour. Hypersonic missiles could cross the world in mere minutes. Recent years have seen the development of a new Russian nuclear-powered cruise missile that would be able to cause serious casualties and environment damage even without a nuclear payload.

I. Introduction

Russia’s nuclear-powered cruise missile, 9M730 Burevestnik, and other similar nuclear-powered delivery system designs are a product, not a cause, of the current tense state of global affairs. Russo-American relations have reached a point of tension not seen since the end of the Cold War. Recent years have seen the breakdown of several key arms control agreements between the US and Russia, namely the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) and the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE). The various SALT (Strategic Arms Limitation Talks) and START (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty) agreements that were instrumental in stabilizing the Cold War and post-Cold War order have been allowed to expire or will expire soon (Countryman 2019). During this time, Russian aggression in Eastern Europe, most notably with its annexation of Crimea and conflict in Ukraine, and its confrontational moves in information warfare, especially Russian interference in the 2016 US election, have caused concerns across the international community.
 
It is in this environment that Russia is looking to upend the status quo of nuclear deterrence with weapon systems that are increasingly difficult to counter or detect once launched. These delivery systems also pose a serious threat to the fragile stability of deterrence. The design of these systems means that their testing alone is incredibly threatening to people and to the environment. Their deployment would be disastrous, their use, catastrophic.
 
This assessment is not based on pure hypotheticals. There has already been a deadly accident that has been attributed to nuclear powered cruise missile 9M730 Burevestnik, NATO codename “Skyfall”. Russia has not hidden its pursuit of this weapon, providing videos of tests and footage of its supposed construction. Nuclear powered cruise missiles are not a new concept. In the 1960s the US experimented with its own design of a nuclear-powered delivery system, but this line of experimentation was abandoned before the actual missile design was ever tested. The source material for this assessment comes from the numerous reports made after the 9M730 Burevestnik accident in August of 2019, the well documented Cold War-era US program to make a similar delivery system, and information that the Russian government has made public in recent years.
 
Certain assumptions have been made in this paper. As deterrence is dependent on adversaries having a solid understanding of an opponents’ capabilities (Jervis 1982), it is not unusual that Russia has given such information about 9M730 Burevestnik. The information should be taken as credible, though with the understanding that it is in Russia’s interest to exaggerate how far advanced the design is and how the system performs in tests. There has been no official confirmation by the Russian government that the accident in Nyonoska was the 9M730 Burevestnik. The majority of American Russia analysts and experts believe it was the 9M730 Burevestnik, and that is the official view of the United States government and of the American President (Restuccia 2019). As will be further discussed, there is significant evidence pointing to 9M730 Burevestnik as the cause of the August accident.

-Read the full article through download.-

Download PDF

References

  1. Boese, Wade. 2008. “Russia Wants Limits on Prompt Global Strike.” Arms Control Association. https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2008-06/russia-wants-limits-prompt-global-strike
  2. Burbach, David T, and Joan Johnson-Freese. 2019. “The Best Defense Ever? Busting Myths About the Trump Administration's Missile Defense Review.” War on the Rocks, February 6, 2019. https://warontherocks.com/2019/02/the-best-defense-ever-busting-myths-about-the-trump-administrations-missile-defense-review/
  3. Collina, Tom Z. n.d. “Russia Breaches INF Treaty, U.S. Says.” Arms Control Association. Accessed March 7, 2020.
    https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2014-09/news/russia-breaches-inf-treaty-us-says
  4. Cooper, Julian. 2018. “Russia's Invincible Weapons: Today, Tomorrow, Sometime, Never?.” Changing Character of War Centre, University of Oxford. 10.13140/RG.2.2.11316.76164.
  5. Countryman, Thomas. 2019. “Russia, China, Arms Control, and the Value of New START.” Arms Control Association.
    https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2019-11/features/russia-china-arms-control-value-new-start
  6. Gady, Franz-Stefan. 2020. “Russia: Delivery of T-14 Armata Main Battle Tank Delayed.” The Diplomat, January 16, 2020. https://thediplomat.com/2020/01/russia-delivery-of-t-14-armata-main-battle-tank-delayed/
  7. Isachenkov, Vladimir. 2019. “Mysterious Missile Explosion in Russia Raises Questions.” Associated Press, 14 August 2019.
    https://www.apnews.com/5971dd6383d64ad4a44cd1fc2f38c501
  8. Jervis, Robert. 1982. "Deterrence and Perception." International Security 7(3): 3-30. Accessed March 7, 2020. https://www.doi.org/10.2307/2538549
  9. Krzyzaniak, John. 2019. “Project Pluto and the Trouble with Russia's Nuclear-Powered Cruise Missile.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, October 3, 2019. https://thebulletin.org/2019/08/project-pluto-and-trouble-with-the-russian-nuclear-powered-cruise-missile/
  10. Mizokami, Kyle. 2019. “Why the U.S. Abandoned Nuclear-Powered Missiles More Than 50 Years Ago.” Popular Mechanics, 13 August 2019. https://www.popularmechanics.com/ military/research/a28690053/russia-nuclear-powered-missile-skyfall/
  11. Peck, Michael. 2019. “Russia Has Begun Underwater Tests of Its Poseidon Thermonuclear Torpedo.” The Center for the National Interest, May 19, 2019. https://nationalinterest.org/blog/ buzz/russia-has-begun-underwater-tests-its-poseidon-thermonuclear-torpedo-58402
  12. Putin, Vladimir. 2018. “Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly.” President of Russia. Kremlin, March 1, 2018.
    http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/ news/56957
  13. Restuccia, Andrew, and Michael R. Gordon. 2019. “Trump Confirms Missile Exploded During Testing in Russia.” The Wall Street Journal, August 13, 2019. https://www.wsj.com/articles/trump-confirms-missile-exploded-during-testing-in-russia-11565648472
  14. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL). 2019. “Report: U.S. Thinks Russian Explosion Tied To Cruise-Missile Program.” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 14 August 2019. https://www.rferl.org/a/report-u-s-thinks-russian-explosion-tied-to-cruise-missile-program/30108760.html
  15. Roblin, Sebastien. 2019. “Why Russia's New Cruise Missile Would Be a Terror on the Battlefield.” The National Interest, 30 September 2019. https://nationalinterest.org/blog/ buzz/why-russias-new-cruise-missile-would-be-terror-battlefield-74146
  16. Rudnitsky, Jake and Ilya Arkhipov. 2019. Bloomberg.com, August 23, 2019. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-08-23/russian-nuclear-blast-theories-hint-at-no-holds-barred-arms-race
  17. Scollon, Michael. 2019. “Russian Nuke-Powered Hypersonic Missile Responsible For Deadly Incident? Not So Fast...” RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty, 17 August 2019. https://www.rferl.org/a/russian-nuclear-accident-nyonoksa-arkhangelsk/30111691.html
  18. Smith, Alexander. 2019. “Failed Russian Nuclear Test Hints at Putin's Dangerous Plans to Beat U.S. Defenses.” NBCNews.com, 13 August 2019. https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/russian-failed-nuclear-test-hints-putin-s-dangerous-plans-beat-n1041721
  19. Tucker, Patrick. 2019. “Nuclear-Powered Cruise Missiles Are a Terrible Idea. Russia's Test Explosion Shows Why.” Defense One, 15 August 2019,
  20. US Department of State. 1983. “Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), 1983.” US Department of State. Accessed March 7, 2020.
    https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/rd/ 104253.htm
  21. Vitkovskaya, Julie. 2016. “How the Soviet Union Stayed Silent during the Chernobyl Disaster.” The Washington Post, April 25, 2016. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2016/04/25/how-the-soviet-union-stayed-silent-during-the-chernobyl-disaster/
  22. Webb, Greg. 2019. “Russian Weapons Accident Raises Nuclear Concerns.” Arms Control Association. https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2019-09/news/russian-weapons-accident-raises-nuclear-concerns

Leah Walker is a student of international relations at Michigan State. Her research focuses on nuclear weapons and emerging technologies.

DISCLAIMER: The findings and conclusions published herein are solely attributed to the author and not necessarily endorsed or adopted by the Journal of Science Policy and Governance. Articles are distributed in compliance with copyright and trademark agreements.

ISSN 2372-2193
Picture
© 2022 Journal of Science Policy & Governance, Inc. All rights reserved. The opinions, findings and conclusions from JSPG publications and events do not necessarily reflect the views of the journal.
  • Home
  • About
    • About
    • JSPG Anniversary Page
    • Staff
    • Ambassadors
    • Boards >
      • Advisory Board
      • Governing Board
      • Editorial Board
    • Careers >
      • Associate Editor
      • Ambassador
    • Partners
    • Sponsorships
    • Contact
  • Volumes
    • GHFUTURES2030 Strengthening Youth-centered Policy and Governance of Digital Transformations in Health.
    • UNESCO AND MGCY OPEN SCIENCE POLICIES AS AN ACCELERATOR FOR ACHIEVING THE SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT GOALS
    • Volume 21 Issue 01 >
      • Cover Memo: Volume 21, Issue 1, Summer Standard Issue
    • JSPG and UCL STEAPP Special Topics: Innovations in Science Diplomacy >
      • Cover Memo: Volume 20, Issue 3, Special Issue on Innovations in Science Diplomacy
    • Sigma XI-JSPG Special Issue: Re-envisioning STEM Education and Workforce Development for the 21st Century
    • Volume 20 Issue 01
    • JSPG Volume 19 Issue 01 (10 Years of Publishing)
    • Special Issue: 2021 NSPN-JSPG Policy Memo Competition
    • Special Issue: Shaping the Future of Science Policy
    • JSPG-UK SIN Special Issue: Climate Change Solutions
    • Volume 18 Issue 01
    • Special Issue: 2020 NSPN-JSPG Policy Memo Competition
    • Volume 17 Issue 01 (Supported by AAAS STPF)
    • JSPG-UN MGCY Special Issue: Impacts of Emerging Technologies
    • Volume 16 Issue 01
    • Volume 15 (Supported by CSPC)
    • Special Issue: 2019 NSPN-JSPG Policy Memo Competition
    • Volume 14
    • Volume 13
    • Volume 12
    • Volume 11
    • Volume 10
    • Volume 9
    • Volume 8
    • Volume 7
    • Volume 6
    • JSPG-UCS Special Issue: Healthy Food Policy
    • Volume 5
    • Volume 4
    • Special Issue: Hot Topics 2013
    • Volume 3
    • Volume 2
    • Volume 1
  • Submit to JSPG
    • Special Topics Call for Submissions: Policy and Governance on Science, Technology and Global Security
    • Special Topics Call for Submissions: Development Policy and Global Change Science to Achieve the Vision of Sustainable Americas
    • Submission deadlines and guidelines
  • Announcements
    • News
    • Blog
  • Events
    • JSPG, APS FPS Events
    • JSPG, IAI Events
    • Leadership chat series
  • Training
    • Writing
    • Resources
  • Media Mentions
  • Policy in action
  • Podcast